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Abstract: Disorders of consciousness (DOC) raise profound scientiﬁc, clinical, ethical, and philosophical
issues. Growing knowledge on fundamental principles of brain organization in healthy individuals offers
new opportunities for a better understanding of residual brain function in DOCs. We here discuss new
perspectives derived from a recently proposed scheme of brain organization underlying consciousness in
healthy individuals. In this scheme, thalamo-cortical networks can be divided into two, often antagonistic,
global systems: (i) a system of externally oriented, sensory-motor networks (the ‘‘extrinsic’’ system); and
(ii) a system of inward-oriented networks (the ‘‘intrinsic’’ or default system). According to this
framework, four distinct mental states would be possible that could be relevant for understanding DOCs.
In normal healthy volunteers and locked-in syndrome patients, a state of high functionality of both the
extrinsic and intrinsic or default systems is expected — associated with full awareness of environment and
self. In this case, mental imagery tasks combined with fMRI can be used to detect covert awareness in
patients that are unable to communicate. According to the framework, two complementary states of
system imbalance are also possible, in which one system is in a hyperfunctional state, while the other is
hypoactive. Extrinsic system hyperfunction is expected to lead to a state of total sensory-motor
‘‘absorption’’ or ‘‘lost self.’’ In contrast, intrinsic or default system hyperfunction is expected to lead to a
state of complete detachment from the external world. A state where both extrinsic and intrinsic systems
are hypofunctional is predicted to lead to markedly impaired consciousness as seen in DOCs. Finally, we
review the potential use of ultra-slow ﬂuctuations in BOLD signal as a tool for assessing the functional
integrity of extrinsic and intrinsic systems during ‘‘resting state’’ fMRI acquisitions. In particular, we
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discuss the potential provided by assessment of these slow spontaneous BOLD ﬂuctuations as a novel tool
in assessing the cognitive state and chances of recovery from brain pathologies underlying DOCs.
Keywords: coma; consciousness; resting state; spontaneous activity; imagery; functional magnetic
resonance imaging; default network
Introduction
Disorders of consciousness (DOC) are a devastat-
ing spectrum of clinical conditions involving
profound disruption in global conscious states
due to massive brain lesions (Bernat, 2006;
Giacino et al., 2002; Laureys et al., 2004; Plum
and Posner, 1972; Schiff, 2006b). Clinical char-
acterization of the different DOCs is based on two
main distinct components of human conscious-
ness: arousal and awareness (Plum and Posner,
1972). If arousal refers to the behavioral alterna-
tion of sleep and wakefulness, awareness refers to
the collective thoughts and feelings of an indivi-
dual (Laureys, 2005). Coma is characterized by
the absence of arousal and hence of awareness.
Vegetative-state patients are aroused but unaware
of environment and self (Jennett and Plum, 1972).
Minimally conscious state patients are unable to
reliably communicate but show reproducible
behavioral evidence of awareness of environment
or self (Giacino et al., 2002, 2004; Majerus et al.,
2005). Locked-in syndrome patients (Plum and
Posner, 1972) are fully conscious but have no
means of producing speech, limb, or facial move-
ments, except for small movements of the eyes or
eyelids.
While progress has been made in describing
DOCs from the clinical perspective (Giacino
et al., 2004), we focus in the present review on
examining DOCs from the point of view of recent
developments and understandings derived from
the healthy human brain. We argue that recent
insights obtained through functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) are relevant to a better
understanding of DOCs and have the potential
of allowing a better diagnosis and treatment
(Giacino et al., 2006; Laureys et al., 2006; Schiff,
2006a, b). Speciﬁcally, we will focus on assessing
brain function in a set of areas, termed the
‘‘default’’ network (Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle
and Snyder, 2007), characterized by higher activity
at rest than during externally oriented sensory-
motor or cognitive tasks. This network appears to
show antagonistic behavior to sensory-motor
areas, which show increased fMRI signal under
such tasks. Importantly, areas belonging to the
default network also show a tendency for coherent
ﬂuctuations both during rest (Greicius et al., 2003;
Nir et al., 2006) and during visual activation
(Hasson et al., 2004) further supporting their
association within a common functional system.
Based on the functional antagonistic proﬁle of
the sensory-motor cortex on the one hand and the
default system on the other, as well as their
complementary neuroanatomical organization
(Boly et al., 2007a; Fox et al., 2005, 2009; Golland
et al., 2007, 2008; Tian et al., 2007; see Fig. 1) we
have proposed (Boly et al., 2008a, b; Golland et
al., 2008) a fundamental ‘‘dual’’ subdivision of the
human cortex into two basic — ‘‘extrinsic’’ versus
‘‘intrinsic’’ — functionalities. More speciﬁcally, we
hypothesize that the cerebral cortex can be
subdivided according to two basic functional
orientations — an ‘‘extrinsic’’ orientation, which
engages sensory-motor cortices, and an ‘‘intrinsic’’
orientation, which engages the default system.
Sensory-motor cortices are involved in the pro-
cessing of information immediately incoming from
the external world, while the complementary
‘‘intrinsic’’ or default system appears to be
involved in self-representations, episodic memory,
mind wandering, and stimulus-independent
thoughts (e.g., see Goldberg et al., 2006; Mason
et al., 2007; D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Laureys et
al., 2007).
We here will address the study of residual brain
function in DOCs from the perspective of this
‘‘extrinsic’’ versus ‘‘intrinsic’’ functional subdivi-
sion and propose a conceptual framework around
which to organize our knowledge and hypotheses
concerning DOCs. Speciﬁcally we will consider
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the proposed fundamental specialization of the human cortex showing the ‘‘extrinsic’’ sensory motor system
and the ‘‘intrinsic’’ or default networks. It is hypothesized that the extrinsic system specializes in processing incoming information
from the external environment, while the more enigmatic intrinsic or default system is specialized in internally oriented functions.
Note the complementary nature of the ‘‘extrinsic’’ and ‘‘intrinsic’’ or default networks. Adapted from Golland et al. (2007).
four different mental states associated with differ-
ent extrinsic–intrinsic organizations, as predicted
by our framework.
High extrinsic and intrinsic functionality: the
‘‘locked-in’’ syndrome
The ﬁrst case to consider is the situation in which
both the extrinsic and intrinsic systems are highly
functional yet the patient is unable to commu-
nicate or report in an effective manner about her
or his mental state. In the case of locked-in
syndrome this situation of disconnection between
internal states and verbal or nonverbal report is
due to quadriplegia and anarthria, classically
caused by a ventral pontine lesion, disrupting the
corticospinal and corticobulbar pathways (Plum
and Posner, 1972; Smart et al., 2008). In the case
of fully conscious but completely paralyzed
patients (i.e., complete locked-in syndrome;
Schnakers et al., 2009), fMRI may be able to
detect response to command using brain activa-
tion in the absence of any overt motor response.
fMRI activation paradigms offer the opportunity
to directly communicate with locked-in syndrome
patients by assessing responses from their brains
without dependence on motor output (Birbaumer
et al., 2008, 2006; Sorger et al., 2009). A
demonstration that this method could effectively
work was provided in recent years by the
successful use of mental imagery tasks and fMRI
imaging to uncover awareness in a patient clinically
assessed as vegetative (Boly et al., 2007b; Owen
et al., 2006). Two important methodological con-
siderations have to be taken into account while
developing fMRI activation paradigms. First, we
need to ﬁnd tasks that produce the most reliable
and robust activation pattern in a single subject.
Second, we need to be cautious in designing the
fMRI paradigms, in order to avoid brain activa-
tions which could occur passively, in the absence of
any willful mental effort. To address these two
issues, we conducted two fMRI experiments in
healthy individuals.
In the ﬁrst experiment, six healthy subjects were
scanned in a 3T MRI scanner during: (i) passive
listening to verbal commands and (ii) active mental
imagery in response to the same instructions.
Mental imagery tasks included: (1) imagining
opening and closing the left hand, (2) mental
calculation (counting down), (3) imaging preparing
luggage, (4) imaging walking from home to work,
(5) covertly describing a face, (6) imaging ﬁlling in
a check, and (7) covertly describing ones own
thoughts. An eighth condition of rest (eyes closed)
was used as a baseline. In the second experiment,
we compared visual mental imagery (eyes closed)
with passive visual stimulation (Farah, 1989; Ganis
et al., 2004). Here, eight healthy subjects were
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scanned in four different conditions: (i) visual,
(ii) imagery, (iii) visual and verbal description
(covert), and (iv) imagery and verbal description
(covert). The tasks (lasting 12 s) included viewing
or imaging: (a) walking from home to work,
(b) ﬁlling a check, (c) observing the own face, and
(d) preparing a luggage. A ﬁfth condition of rest
(blank screen for visual and keeping the eyes
closed for imagery) was used as reference ‘‘base-
line’’ activity. A common ﬁnding for all active tasks
in the ﬁrst experiment (Fig. 2) was a widespread
activation encompassing bilateral intraparietal sul-
cus, primary sensory-motor areas, supplementary
motor area, parahippocampal gyrus, inferior and
middle temporal gyri, language-related and inferior
frontal areas. Together with the activation pattern,
there was also a consistent activity reduction in the
intrinsic or default network during performance of
the tasks. In Fig. 2, the superimposed contour map
show the intrinsic or default network (identiﬁed
using independent component analysis from a
group of seven healthy volunteers scanned during
10min ‘‘eyes-closed resting state’’) encompassing
precuneus and adjacent posterior cingulate cortex,
mesiofrontal cortex and adjacent anterior cingulate
cortex, and bilateral temporoparietal junctions
areas. The combined increased activation of the
extrinsic network and the deactivation of the
intrinsic system suggest that mental imagery tasks
have a preferentially extrinsic component, likely
due to a process of ‘‘replay’’ of extrinsic sensory-
motor activations (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008).
These activations were consistent across individual
subjects. Table 1 shows identiﬁed areas for the
seven different mental imagery tasks. In line with
previous studies (e.g., Boly et al., 2007b), the
spatial navigation task (imagining walking from
home to work) was among the tasks showing the
most consistent activity across subjects (together
with imagery tasks of writing a check and prepar-
ing a luggage). Figure 3 shows the activation
patterns during two different sessions for the active
mental imagery task (spatial navigation) compared
to activation induced by passive listening to the
same task instructions. While passive listening did
not elicit activation, both active imagery tasks
elicited activation of parahippocampal areas, well
known to be involved in spatial navigation tasks
(Epstein et al., 1999; Epstein and Kanwisher,
1998). This differential activation in active
Fig. 2. Common activation and deactivation patterns (as compared to eyes-closed resting) observed during seven mental imagery
tasks (i.e., imagining opening and closing the left hand; mental calculation; imaging preparing luggage; imaging walking from home to
work; covertly describing ones own face; imaging ﬁlling in a check and covertly describing ones own thoughts). Fixed effects group
analysis thresholded at false discovery rate corrected po0.05. The contours of the independently identiﬁed default mode network are
contoured in black. Note the robust imagery-related activation overlapping with regions associated with the extrinsic system (see text
for details).
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Table 1. Random effect group analyses identifying areas activating during the seven mental imagery tasks as compared to eyes-
closed resting state
Imagery task Region X Y Z T-value p-value
Imagining opening and Superior parietal lobe �36 �35 40 9.3 o0.001
closing the left hand Supplementary motor area 2 7 50 6.5 o0.001
Middle temporal gyrus �50 �52 3 6.4 o0.001
Counting down Superior parietal lobe �42 �33 40 5.7 o0.001
Precentral gyrus �53 2 23 5.5 o0.001
Supplementary motor area �1 4 51 5.2 o0.001
Imaging preparing luggage Superior parietal lobe �35 �34 42 6.2 o0.001
Parieto-occipital sulcus �18 �59 44 5.4 o0.001
Supplementary motor area �5 5 48 5.3 o0.001
Imaging walking from home to work Parahippocampal gyrus �13 �56 10 7.1 o0.001
Superior parietal lobe �35 �34 38 6.6 o0.001
Medial occipitotemporal gyrus �24 �36 �7 5.7 o0.001
Describing a face Superior parietal lobe �44 �30 38 7.9 o0.001
Supplementary motor area �5 5 50 5.9 o0.001
Lateral occipitotemporal gyrus �40 �54 �14 5.3 o0.001
Imaging ﬁlling a check Superior parietal lobe �48 �29 42 6.7 o0.001
Superior parietal lobe �33 �35 40 6.4 o0.001
Middle temporal gyrus �44 �45 �4 6.2 o0.001
Describing own thoughts Middle frontal gyrus �44 �1 51 4.9 o0.001
Superior parietal lobe �46 �33 41 4.6 o0.001
Superior temporal gyrus �61 �39 10 4.3 o0.001
compared to passive conditions strengthens the
hypothesis that observed brain responses are
indeed associated with intentional mental effort
and are not merely induced by passive listening to
the task instructions. Finally, Fig. 4 illustrates brain
activation patterns when one sees a video of
oneself walking (visual) compared to imagining
oneself walking, and when the visual imagery
process is accompanied by a covert description.
The activation of Broca’s area both in the
‘‘imagining’’ and ‘‘imagining and verbal descrip-
tion’’ conditions suggests that even when subjects
were asked to perform the mental imagery tasks
using only visualization strategies they could not
avoid adding a verbal component to the visual
imagery aspect.
Overall, three conclusions can be drawn from
these results. First, robust brain activations can be
elicited and measured with fMRI without the
subjects performing any overt responses. This
brain activation seems particularly robust in tasks
involving action planning, while recognition tasks
such as imagining faces seemed less effective.
Second, the obtained activations could be
differentiated in a reproducible manner from the
passive conditions in which subjects did not engage
in any active mental imagery. Finally, requiring a
verbal description of the cognitive action while
performing mental imaging tasks increases the
neural activation intensity and extent. These results
are encouraging in showing that a consistently
detected increase in fMRI signal can be obtained
when subjects are engaged in active mental
imagery, and that this activation pattern can be
reliably differentiated from the more automatic
neural responses to presentation of the task
instructions. On the other hand, for communication
purposes, it appears that relying only on the
patterns of activations associated with different
mental imagery tasks may not be an effective
solution as in the above-reported study many
patterns of activations were rather similar between
tasks. In this context, it is useful to also collect
information on the timing of the fMRI response to
a given task (i.e., starting time and latency of the
subject’s BOLD response) in order to better
segregate the activation patterns elicited by differ-
ent mental imagery tasks (see Sorger et al., 2009).
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Fig. 3. Activation patterns observed during two different sessions of active mental imagery (spatial navigation) compared to
activation induced by passive listening to the same task instructions. Fixed effects group analysis thresholded at false discovery rate
corrected po0.05. Superimposed are the contours of the default mode network as in Fig. 2. Parahippocampal gyrus activity
(Talairach coordinates X ¼ �13, Y ¼ �15, Z ¼ 10mm) is shown for each of the six healthy volunteers for the three acquisitions.
Note the consistently higher activation during active imagery compared to passive listening.
We described here the ﬁrst condition predicted
by the framework, that is, full consciousness with
preserved functionality of both extrinsic and
intrinsic networks, and the use of mental imagery
tasks to detect this condition in brain-damaged
patients. We will now consider two hypothetical
situations in which there is an imbalance between
the extrinsic and intrinsic systems.
‘‘Losing the self’’: hypoactivity of the
intrinsic system
Perhaps the most robust fMRI ﬁnding which
concerns the functionality of the intrinsic or
default system is the consistent reduction of
activity in this network during performance of
cognitively demanding externally oriented tasks
such as visual recognition and motor planning
(Gusnard et al., 2001). In contrast, the intrinsic
system shows increased fMRI activity during no-
task ‘‘resting’’ conditions, leading to the notion
that this network might be a ‘‘task-negative’’
system (Fox et al., 2005, 2009) or be engaged in a
‘‘default’’ function during resting conditions
(Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle and Snyder, 2007).
It has been proposed that this reduced activity
may be attributed to the fact that during an
intense externally oriented task, the performing
subject is fully attentive to the external world, and
metaphorically speaking ‘‘loses itself’’ in the act
(Goldberg et al., 2006; Golland et al., 2007). What
then could be the outcome of a permanent
reduction in the intrinsic system activity due to
brain abnormality? Since no direct data are
available, yet from DOCs one can only
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Fig. 4. Activation patterns induced by passively seeing a video of oneself walking (visual); imagining oneself walking (imagery),
covert verbal description during the visual stimulation, and covert verbal description during the mental visual imagery task. Fixed
effects group analysis thresholded at false discovery rate corrected po0.01. Superimposed are the contours of the default mode
network. Note the substantial overlap of activity patterns between all four conditions, and the enhancement in neural activation
associated with verbal descriptions.
extrapolate from studies in healthy individuals. It
appears that some aspect of the intrinsic system
function may be associated with voluntary deci-
sions and action initiation (Goldberg et al., 2008).
Extrapolating from such ﬁndings leads to the
conjecture that a possible consequence of a
pathological damage to this system might be a
condition akin to catatonic or akinetic mutism
(Naccache et al., 2004) in which the patient is
unable to voluntarily initiate a motor action — in
De Tiege et al. (2003) akinetic mutism was indeed
linked to medial prefrontal dysfunction. Note that
such a condition, associated with lack of move-
ment, could in principle masquerade as a DOC
since the patient may not initiate any response or
communication.
‘‘Self-centered absorption’’
The third condition predicted by the framework,
in which the extrinsic system is hypofunctional,
would be reﬂected by the disengagement of the
subjects from the external environment. Few hints
associate such conditions with ‘‘mind wandering,’’
where typically high default network activity is
observed (Christoff et al., 2009; Gilbert et al.,
2007; Mason et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2009). While
these notions ﬁt the conceptual framework of an
antagonistic relationship between the extrinsic
and intrinsic networks — that is, an enhancement
in intrinsic activity comes at the expense of
processing of the extrinsic information, the
relevant data are too scant as yet. Nevertheless,
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it is tempting to speculate how a pathological
imbalance in which the extrinsic system is largely
inactive should be reﬂected in the mental state of
DOCs. From our conceptual framework we
anticipate that such an imbalance would manifest
itself again in a severe motor inaction, but also in
a reduced sensory responsivity (since the patient
is detached and self-absorbed and is incapable
of orienting to the external world) either in terms
of receiving sensory signals, or emitting motor
actions. Behaviorally, then, the two conditions
(‘‘lost self’’ and ‘‘self-centered absorption’’) could
paradoxically lead to similar behavioral manifes-
tations. Again, brain imaging, and particularly the
study of spontaneous cerebral BOLD ﬂuctuations
by means of fMRI, might provide useful clues in
diagnosing these hypothetical conditions — as will
be discussed later. Finally, we consider the
possibility that both systems are abnormally
hypofunctional. In this case, we predict a deep
DOC in which the patient does not respond and is
also incapable of initiating any voluntary commu-
nication. In such severe and widespread brain
abnormalities we expect a greatly reduced brain
metabolism and a general reduction in neuronal
activity.
Spontaneous fMRI activity patterns as a
diagnostic tool in DOCs
Although the above discussions of possible
abnormalities associated with the new framework
of brain organization are largely hypothetical and
speculative, they do illustrate the complexity of
brain abnormalities that could produce behavioral
symptoms which may deceptively appear identical
at the behavioral level. Here, the potentially
powerful approach of functional brain imaging
(Hirsch, 2005; Laureys et al., 2000, 1999a, b;
Schiff et al., 2005) and particularly of fMRI may
come as a useful and incisive tool. It may be
argued that functional neuroimaging, if using
active paradigms (Boly et al., 2007b; Owen et al.,
2006, 2007) will be useful only in those limited
‘‘pseudo locked-in’’ cases where the patient
behaviorally looks unconscious but in reality is
fully aware and can initiate complex voluntary
mental activity. Recent progress in studying
spontaneous brain activity (Biswal et al., 1995;
Cordes et al., 2000; Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Fox
and Raichle, 2007; Fox et al., 2005; Greicius et al.,
2003; Lowe et al., 1998; Mitra et al., 1997; Nir
et al., 2006; Vincent et al., 2007; Xiong et al., 1999)
demonstrating activity patterns that emerge
without any task or sensory stimulation, promise
for studying higher-order associative network
functionality and revealing their potential
abnormalities in the absence of the patients’
collaboration (Boly et al., 2009b; Greicius et al.,
2004; Rombouts et al., 2009).
The functional signiﬁcance of low-frequency
fMRI activity ﬂuctuations remains yet poorly
understood. A demonstration that such sponta-
neous activity occurs in primary sensory systems is
of particular importance in this context. Indeed,
the spontaneous nature of brain activity can be
ascertained in such systems, if the sensory stimuli
are completely blocked, and careful controls for
imagery and attention are used (Nir et al., 2006,
2008). Recent research using intracranial record-
ings have revealed a putative electrophysiolo-
gical correlate of such fMRI spontaneous activity
in the neuronal responses of human cortex
(He et al., 2008; Nir et al., 2008). More speciﬁ-
cally, during resting-state conditions the human
cortex manifests ultra-slow modulations of neuro-
nal activity reﬂected both in ﬁring rate modula-
tions of individually isolated cortical neurons, as
well as in modulation of high-frequency gamma
power of local ﬁeld potentials. These ultra-slow
ﬂuctuations show a remarkable coherence
across functionally similar sites, and interestingly,
are greatly accentuated during different sleep
stages. Figure 5 depicts an example of such
spontaneous activity recorded bilaterally from
human auditory cortex during quiet rest (stage
II sleep), showing a remarkable coherence of the
activity in auditory cortices of both hemispheres.
Although these activity patterns have a much
slower dynamics than task-related activations
(Nir et al., 2008), their widespread nature and
remarkable reproducibility among subjects
(Damoiseaux et al., 2006) makes them a potential
tool for assessing the viability and functionality of
cortical networks.
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Fig. 5. Intracranial recordings obtained from bilateral auditory cortex depicting gamma power modulations in the local ﬁeld
potentials. Note the ultra-slow, spontaneous ﬂuctuations and their remarkable correlation across the two hemispheres. Adapted from
Nir et al. (2008).
Data-driven approaches such as independent
component analysis (Hyva¨rinen, 1999) or k-clus-
tering (Golland et al., 2008) applied to spontaneous
activity, could reveal a full set of independent
networks with a particular spatial distribution
and a characteristic frequency power spectrum
(Beckmann et al., 2005; De Luca et al., 2006;
Esposito et al., 2008, 2006, 2005; Mantini et al.,
2007; McKeown et al., 1998; Perlbarg and Marre-
lec, 2008). The advantage of studying these activity
patterns is that they nicely correspond to the
functional organization of global brain systems
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Hagmann et al., 2008;
Honey et al., 2009). Thus, cortical systems, which
are functionally coupled during task performance,
also show a similar coupling of spontaneous
activity. Consequently, these spontaneous activa-
tions offer a tool in assessing cortical functional
abnormalities in patients that cannot cooperate.
Indeed, a recent report has presented important
evidence that such spontaneous activity can pro-
vide a sensitive marker for detecting cortical
abnormalities in neurodegenerative disorders
(Seeley et al., 2009). More speciﬁc to DOCs, we
have recently demonstrated that default network
connectivity was decreased in severely brain-
damaged patients in proportion to their degree of
consciousness impairment Boly et al., (2009);
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (submitted), Boly et al.,
(2009), demonstrated absent cortico-thalamic
BOLD functional connectivity (i.e., cross-correla-
tion between precuneal areas and medial thalamus)
but partially preserved cortico-cortical connectivity
within the default network in a vegetative-state
patient studied 2.5 years following cardio-respira-
tory arrest (see Fig. 6). In a more comprehensive
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Fig. 6. Positive correlations with precuneal and posterior cingulate activity in a healthy volunteer, a patient in brain death and a
patient in a vegetative state. Results are thresholded at false discovery rate corrected po0.001. Note that there is no residual long-
range functional connectivity in brain death. In the vegetative state, despite the presence of residual functional connectivity within
the default network, the observed activity is reduced compared to healthy controls. Adapted from Boly et al. (2009).
study (Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (submitted)) 14
noncommunicative brain-damaged patients and 14
healthy controls participated in a resting-state
fMRI protocol. Connectivity was investigated using
probabilistic-independent component analysis and
an automated template-matching component selec-
tion approach. Connectivity in all default network
areas was found to be linearly correlated with the
degree of consciousness, ranging from healthy
volunteers and locked-in syndrome to minimally
conscious, vegetative, and comatose patients.
Furthermore, precuneus connectivity was found to
be signiﬁcantly stronger in minimally conscious
patients compared to vegetative-state patients.
Locked-in syndrome patients’ default network
connectivity was shown not to be signiﬁcantly
different from healthy control subjects.
A remaining issue in the study of spontaneous
BOLD signal ﬂuctuations, especially for patients
that show a signiﬁcantly reduced neuronal activ-
ity, is the possible contamination by noise sources
(Birn et al., 2006; Chuang and Chen, 2001; Cordes
et al., 2000). Different strategies have been
adopted based on two major deﬁning character-
istics of spontaneous brain activity as reported
also by fMRI studies: (i) their tendency to be
correlated across hemispheres (Biswal et al., 1995;
Cordes et al., 2000; Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Fox
and Raichle, 2007; Fox et al., 2005; Golland et al.,
2007; Greicius et al., 2003; Lowe et al., 1998; Nir
et al., 2006; Vincent et al., 2007; Xiong et al., 1999)
and (ii) their neuroanatomical selectivity, that is,
such ﬂuctuations are not global, and distinct
functional systems are often decorrelated (Biswal
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et al., 1995; Cordes et al., 2000; Damoiseaux et al.,
2006; Fox and Raichle, 2007; Fox et al., 2005;
Golland et al., 2007; Greicius et al., 2003; Lowe
et al., 1998; Nir et al., 2006; Vincent et al., 2007;
Xiong et al., 1999). Data-driven approaches like
independent component analysis offer the advan-
tage to better isolate physiological artifacts from
the neuronal components and are now being
commonly adopted in this ﬁeld (Beall and Lowe,
2007; Birn et al., 2008; Perlbarg et al., 2007).
In conclusion, the integration and cross-refer-
encing from recent advances in studying the
healthy human brain provide new conceptual
frameworks and methodological approaches that
could help better diagnosing and understanding
DOC. We here emphasized two perspectives for
such integration: (i) from a neuroanatomical point
of view (i.e., the subdivision of the human cortex
according to a fundamental extrinsic versus
intrinsic specialization reﬂected in two global and
complementary cortico-thalamic systems); and
(ii) from a functional point of view (i.e., the
discovery of spontaneous ultra-slow and coherent
activity patterns). Both perspectives are likely to
provide important advances in our attempts to
reach across the abyss and gain further insight in
the neural correlates of human consciousness.
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